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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
The Contested Legend of al-Kâhina: Prophetess or Propaganda? 
by 
Jessica Leigh Keuter 
Master of Arts in African Studies 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019 
Professor Ghislaine Lydon, Chair 
 
 
With depictions ranging from anti-Muslim resistance warrior of the seventh century to mythical 
priestess, al-Kâhina looms large in the historical narratives of North African Amazigh, Jewish, and 
Arab peoples. Despite her legendary status, al-Kâhina’s existence as a historical female figure who 
reigned over the Amazigh is disputed. In this paper, I highlight the long history of colonial 
occupation and continual resistance organizing by the Amazigh prior to al-Kâhina’s battles with 
the Arab invaders at the end of the seventh century. Through analysis of secondary sources, I 
examine how both Arab and French occupations appropriated the legend to promote their agendas. 
I argue that al-Kâhina’s story has been used to enforce or combat different political agendas, both 
historically and today. Presently in the region , al-Kâhina  has been iconized and used as the “face” 
of Amazigh nationalist and cultural movements.  
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“Someday we’ll all be gone 
But lullabies go on and on 
They never die…” 
     ~ Billy Joel  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Al-Kâhina1 is a disputed female figure who may have reigned over an Imazighen clan in North 
Africa during the seventh century. She is featured in the historical narratives of North African 
Imazighen, Jewish, and Arab societies. Some historians depict her as a mythical queen of the Aures 
Mountains, located on the Northern border of present-day Algeria and Tunisia. In this paper, I 
examine this contested figure based on a review of the relevant secondary sources written by 
scholars drawing on historical, archeological, and linguistic evidence. By addressing the various 
interpretations of the epithets of her name and the discourse surrounding her religious beliefs, 
specifically highlighting the portrayal of al-Kâhina since her death by different groups in the 
region, I will validate al-Kâhina as a historical figure and show how the Imazighen have an 
extensive history of resistance organizing. Scholars have examined this subject relying nearly 
exclusively on Arabic written sources, the earliest dating to the late eighth century. Several works 
have been translated to, or written in, French.  Due to language limitations, my research is restricted 
to English works and translations of key texts.  
It is important to begin with a discussion of the relevant terminology prevailing in the 
Western scholarship. Berber is the identifier commonly used when discussing the Imazighen 
people. Several theories seek to explain the origins of the Berber epithet, which is now considered 
                                               
1 “al” (sometimes written “el”) that precedes Kâhina translates to English as “the.”  
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derogatory. The parallels to the term barbaric (and the French noun barbare), are commonly 
noted. Another common explanation is that the Arabs conquered North Africa they used the Arabic 
term barbar, which means “babble noisily” or “jabber”  to label the Imazighen.2  
As the historian  Maddy-Weitzman explains: 
 
Today, the term is viewed by many Berbers as pejorative and, as their modern 
ethnonational consciousness deepens, is increasingly being supplanted by 
“Imazighen”… Some modern-day Imazighen militants take great umbrage not only 
with the term “Berber” but with “Maghrib” as well, viewing them, not wholly 
unreasonably, as one more indication that their status is politically, socially, 
culturally, and historically subordinate.3  
 
Al-Maghrib or the Maghreb, Arabic for “far west”, refers to the North African region 
encompassing Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, and Western Sahara. Due the term 
being imposed by the Arabs, presently, “[t]he Imazighen Culture Movement’s own term of choice 
is “Tamazgha.”4 The term Imazighen (plural of Amazigh) may stem from the Tuareg word 
amajeah, translating to “free person” or “noble” and is how the group self-identifies.5 Though 
scholarship being discussed often uses Berber and Maghrib, in this paper I will be use Imazighen 
and Tamazgha.  
The Imazighen form a number of distinct clan groups, which are divided by lineages 
comprised of family units.  Historically, the Imazighen are matrilineal, tracing descendance 
through the female line. This explains in part why in the past Amazigh women assumed prominent 
roles in both public and private life. The primary spoken languages of the Imazighen are 
                                               
2 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North African States (Austin, TX: 
University of Texas, 2011), 2. 
 
3 Ibid., 2-3. 
 
4 Ibid., 4. 
 
5Michael Brett and Elizabeth Fentress, The Berbers (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1997), 6.   
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Tamazight, Tashelhit, Tamesheq, and Kabyle which form part of the Afro-Asiatic language family. 
Tifinagh is the script of the Imazighen, first attested in the fifth century BCE. The diversity of the 
Imazighen is symbolized by their flag   which is used to promote unity amongst the clans. Each of 
the stripes are of equal size to show equality. The colors represent the areas Imazighen clans reside:  
blue the ocean, green the mountains, and yellow the sands of the Sahara.  
Depictions of al-Kâhina vary from an anti-hero of Islam to a resistance warrior of the 
Amazigh people. Before the Arab invasions, Christianity was widespread in the region with the 
Roman occupation, leading scholars to infer al-Kâhina was Christian. Other sources depict al-
Kâhina as Jewish relying on oral traditions, interpretations of Kâhina6, and Abd al-Rahmân Ibn 
                                               
6 Some argue Kahina, sometimes spelled Kahena or Cahena, is an epithet and her real name to be Dahya, Daya, 
Dihia, Dihya, or Damiya. 
Figure 1  Imazighen Flag  
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Khaldûn’s writings.  During the twentieth century, al-Kâhina’s story was appropriated by the 
French government to promote their colonial agenda. In the region today, al-Kâhina has been 
iconized and used as the “face” of Imazighen social activism. I argue that the various imagined 
characteristics of al-Kâhina’s story have been used to advance different political agendas, both in 
the past and present.  
There is no consensus on al-Kâhina’s legend, however, several sources depict her as a 
seventh century female ruler from the Jarawa clan of the Kabyle Imazighen in the Aures 
Mountains. Who before her defeat scorched the fields and tress to prevent the Arabs from acquiring 
resources. . It is purported that she had the gift of prophecy and she foresaw not only the Arab 
invasion, but her death at the hands of General Hassân Ibn al-Nu'mân al-Ghassani, which occurred 
circa 700. Among the most prominent characters featured in al- Kâhina legend are Kusayla, Khâlid 
b. Yazîd al-Absî7 or Khâlid b. Yazîd al-Qaysi8, and General Hassân. Kusayla is commonly 
described as the Christianized Amazigh chief and predecessor to al-Kâhina as general of the 
military resistance to the Arab invasions in circa 670. Khâlid is depicted as an Arab man taken 
prisoner by al-Kâhina who either adopted him as a son or made him her lover. Lastly, is General 
Hassân, who is responsible for leading the Arab campaign in North Africa and presumably 
beheading al-Kâhina.  
The writings of Abd al-Rahmân Ibn Khaldûn (d.1406), are central to the construction of 
al-Kâhina’s narative. He was a Muslim historian born in present-day Tunisia. Islamic historian 
Adam Silverstein questions Ibn Khaldûn’s historical approach, claiming “[he] spent much of his 
                                               
7 Abdelmajid Hannoum, Colonial Histories, Post-Colonial Memories: The Legend of the Kâhina, A North African 
Heroine (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2001), 6. 
 
8 H.T. Norris, The Berbers in Arabic Literature (Essex, London: Longman Group Limited, 1982), 50.  
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adult life immersed in self-serving schemes and political machinations.”9 Silverstein asserts that 
Ibn Khaldûn,  
saw history as the product of certain identifiable, dynamic processes, such as the 
interaction between barbarians imbued with ‘tribal’ cohesions (‘asabiyya) and the 
settled civilizations they bordered. Ibn Khaldûn’s theory of history dictates that 
barbarians will occasionally unite to overrun neighbouring civilizations and 
become civilized themselves, only to be conquered by a new batch of barbarians as 
the process is repeated indefinitely… [he] saw history as cyclical and subject to 
rules and patterns.10  
 
Though critical of the approach, Silverstein acknowledges Ibn Khaldûn’s impact on current 
scholarship and academia, and relevance as a historical source.  
The major contribution to al-Kâhina’s story made by Ibn Khaldûn is his assertion that she 
was Jewish. The often-cited passage, as translated by Abdelmajid Hannoum, is the foundation for 
arguments about al-Kâhina’s Jewishness is as follows: 
It is possible that some of these Berbers professed Judaism that they took from the 
Children of Israel when their kingdom extended and thus became near to Syria. 
This was the case of the population of the Awras mountains, the tribe of the Kâhina 
who was killed by the Arabs early on during the conquests. This was also the case 
of the Naffusa, a Berber Tribe from Ifriqiya, the Qandalawa, the Madyuna, the 
Ghiyata, and the Banu Fazzan, a tribe of the Berbers of the far Maghrib.11  
 
Hannoum insists that the goal of Ibn Khaldûn’s work, entitled Kitâb al-‘lbar (Book of Lessons), 
is to “restore a positive image of the Berbers by relating them to an Arab origin and showing their 
noble qualities,”12 and many scholars, including myself, agree with Hannoum.  
                                               
9 Adam J. Silverstein, Islamic History: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 104. 
 
10 Ibid., 105. 
 
11 Hannoum, Colonial Histories, 18. 
 
12 Ibid., 16. 
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Ibn Khaldûn provides additional information, such as a genealogical history of the 
Imazighen, including al- Kâhina’s clan, claiming her full name was Dihya bint Tabîta b. Nîqân b. 
Bâwrâ b. Maskisrî b. Afrad b. Wasîla b. Jrâw. Tunisian historian Mohammed Talbi (d. 2017 CE) 
provides a very different genealogy for al-Kâhina and writes: “ ‘Dihya daughter of Matiya son of 
Tifian’ (ie. Dahya, daughter of Mathew, son of Theophanes),” in support of the argument that she 
was in fact Christian.13 The tracing of kinships are unclear. Ibn Khaldûn’s would seem to be 
matrilineal (Tabita) and Talbi’s patrilineal (Mathew), but ultimately, we are unable to determine 
with certainty as surnames were not used as they are today. As linguist Fatima Sadiqi points out: 
The Punic and Roman genealogies survived through Muslim Middle Ages…. 
Berber matronymic customs go back to the pre-Carthage era. In the Punic era, 
epitaphs on ancient tombs recorded maternal lineage and ancient Libyans 
sometimes had matronymic names indicating female lineage. This tradition 
continued after the foundation of Carthage, as archaeologists noted the regular 
persistence of matronymic names.14   
 
 
In addition to the aforementioned debates regarding her genealogy and spiritual beliefs, 
some of the vacillating elements of her legend include: her existence as a historical figure, the 
number of battles she had with General Hassân, her offspring – how many and what happened to 
them, her motives for leading an uprising against the Arabs, and the governing policies she 
implemented. In the literary review section of this paper, these topics will be discussed in more 
detail. Before examining the literature, it is important to understand the history of the region. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
13 Benjamin Hendrickx, "Al-Kâhina: The Last Ally of the Roman-Byzantines in the Maghreb Against the Muslim 
Arab Conquest,” Journal of Early Christian History 3 (2013), 57.  
 
14 Fatima Sadiqi, Moroccan Feminist Discourses (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 45-46. 
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Historical Context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Early Imazighen and Jews 
 
In the 1950s, archeological excavations of the Fezzan Valleys, located in the southwest region of 
present-day Libya, yielded the discovery of nearly 60,000 tombs dated as early as 1,000 BCE. 
Evidence also revealed that the large site known as Garama (present-day Jarmah) had livestock 
and was, “a mixed farming community, without a visible hierarchy within the settlement itself.”15 
These were the ruins of the capital of the Garamantes, the earliest known city of Imazighen in the 
region, yet, not written about until the fifth century BCE by Greek historian, Herodotus.16 It is 
difficult to pinpoint Imazighen origins as, “the Berbers’ geographical and anthropological origins 
are themselves veiled: as far as can be determined, they are multiple, emanating from the 
Mediterranean, Nile Valley, and the Sahara, resulting in a composite population during Neolithic 
times.”17 Although the origins of Imazighen are indeterminate, what is evident is they are the 
indigenous peoples of North Africa.   
                                               
15 Brett and Fentress, The Berbers, 24. 
 
16 According to Brett and Fentress, “The really original aspect of the North African prehistoric cultures is evident 
not on the Mediterranean coast but the Sahara, in the highlands of Tibesti and Tassili, the Hoggar and west to the 
Atlantic coast. In these areas, and to a lesser extent in Kabylia and the Saharan Atlas, are found numerous elaborate 
rock carvings and paintings.” (Ibid., 17.) 
 
17 Maddy-Weitzman, Berber Identity Movement, 14.  
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It is unclear when the Jewish population emerged in North Africa. There is a debate 
whether Jewish arrival was marked by the destruction of Solomon’s Temple (587 BCE) or the 
destruction of the second Temple (70 CE). Historian and expert on early Christianity in North 
Africa Francois Decret  asserts that, “[b]efore the end of the third century BCE,some noteworthy 
Jewish settlements had been formed…[f]rom very early on, the Jews began to migrate in 
successive waves toward the Berber regions and settle there.”18 So far, the speculation of Jewish 
populations in the region prior to the first century CE is largely based on Jewish oral traditions.   
The controversial theory of Judeo-Berbers, first introduced by archeologist & Hebrew 
literature expert Nahum Slouschz, is based on Ibn Khaldûn’s Kitâb al-lbar.  
The truth which should be accepted regarding the origin of Berbers is that they are 
descendants of Canaan, son of Ham, son of Noah, as indicated in the presentation 
of the genealogies of men since the creation. The name of their ancestor is Mazigh; 
the Kerethetes [Arqish] and the Philistines were their brothers; their brothers, 
Casluhim, son of Ham. Their King Jault [Goliath] is well known as one of their 
kings. There were well-known wars between Philistines and the Children of Israel 
in Syria. The Canaanites and the Kerethetes were allies of the Philistines. This is 
what one must believe, because it is the truth that one must not ignore.19  
    
The passage depicts more than a genealogy, “[a]scribing Semantic and Arab origins to the Berbers 
served… [to] promote a reconciliation based on the return of long-lost cousins to the fold.”20   Until 
more sources are discovered on early Jewish migration and conversions, it will remain unclear 
when Judaism spread in Tamazgha. What is clear is that the Jewish population has a deep-rooted 
history in North Africa and had early contact with Imazighen peoples.     
 
 
 
                                               
18 Francois Decret, Early Christianity in North Africa (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books 2009), 13-14. 
 
19 Hannoum, Colonial Histories, 17-18. 
   (Brackets inserted by Hannoum in his translation of the text from Arabic to English) 
 
20 Maddy-Weitzman, Berber Identity Movement, 33. 
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Phoenicians and Greek Colonies 
 
In approximately 814 BCE, the port city of Carthage (near present-day Tunis, Tunisia) was settled 
by Phoenicians migrating from Tyre (in present-day Lebanon).   
Elissa, sister of King Pygmalion (who is a historical figure), left Tyre when her 
royal brother killed her husband and confiscated his property. In the course of 
retelling, the name “Dido”, which is Greek rather than Phoenician, came to be given 
Elissa, and it became famous through Virgil’s Aeneid. Thus conflict in Tyre, which 
might have been a political nature, was responsible for the emigration to what 
became called Qart Hadasht (the new town) from which the name “Carthage” 
derived.21    
 
800-miles across the Mediterranean to the East, Cyrenaica (Mediterranean coastal region in the 
northwest of present-day Libya) was colonized by the Greeks in the seventh century BCE. 
Phoenicians were categorized as either Libyphoenicians or Syrophoencians. Libyphoencians were 
in North Africa and synonymous with Carthaginians, they were Greek or gentile often Imazighen. 
Syrophenicians were in the East, such as Tyre.  
In the fourth and first centuries BCE, the region was fraught with wars. From 480 BCE 
until 306 BCE there were seven wars between the Greeks and Carthaginians, to gain control over 
the Western Mediterranean Island of Sicily. This was followed by three Roman-Punic Wars during 
264 BCE until 146 BCE.  
 
Early Romans 
 
Overlapping the aforementioned conquerors, are the Imazighen living outside of Carthage, 
historically referred to as Numidians. Historian Abun-Nasr points out, “[b]y the third century B.C. 
the Greeks had come to use the name “Lybian” to refer specifically to the non-Phoenicians living 
within the Carthaginian state, while speaking of the other Berbers as the Numidians, the 
                                               
21 Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 15. 
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“Nomads”, a name which reflected the fact that most of them were pastoralist.”22 By the end of 
the first Punic War, around 220 BCE, Numidians had three kingdoms. The Mauri Kingdom was 
ruled by Baga and located in present-day Morocco and West Algeria. The Massyli kingdom was 
ruled by Masinissa and located south of Constantine and “there is some evidence that it extended 
along a line of salt lakes and oases all the way to the Tunisian coast at Gabes, and from there down 
to the Lesser Syrtis.”23 Masaesyli, the largest of the three kingdoms, was located in the northern 
half of present-day Algeria and ruled by Syphax.  
During the second Punic war (218-201 BCE), between Carthage and Rome, another battle 
took place between Carthage ally Syphax (Masaesyli) and Rome supporter Masinissa (Massyli). 
                                               
22 Ibid., 7. 
 
23 Brett and Fentress, The Berbers, 25. 
 
Map 1 North Africa at the end of Masinissa's reign 
 
(Brett and Fentress, The Berbers, 28) 
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Carthage’s loss of the war resulted in Rome gaining the allegiance of 473 clans of Numidia. 
Masinissa and his successors are referred to as the Numidian Kings.  
In the third Punic war (151-146 BCE), the Carthaginians resisted Rome’s attempt to drive 
them out of the city. Due to Carthage’s port location they were able to resist occupation for three 
years until 146 BCE when they surrendered. Attempting to thwart resistance efforts, Rome 
implemented a scorched earth policy, destroying Carthage, yet their tactic was ultimately futile. 
Rome, “annexed the region of conquered Carthage, an area comprising at least 25,00 square 
kilometers—which roughly corresponds to the northeast tier of modern Tunisia.”24 Additionally, 
“[o]utside their province, the Romans established a protectorate over Numidia, thus enabling 
Italian merchants to trade with Berbers without assuming the burdens of its military occupation.”25 
Though Rome was able to assert its geographical domination, the Imazighen were not going to 
acquiesce.   
Jugurtha was a key resistance leader against the establishment of Rome’s first province, 
who, like his grandfather Masinissa, sought the creation of a united Imazighen Kingdom.  
Resembling his predecessors, he adopted fighting skills acquired from his encounters with Roman 
armies, combining them with Numidian strategies. As we will see in future encounters between 
Imazighen and foreign invaders, “[t]he Jugurthine war was in many ways a paradigm for future 
wars,” encompassing, “most of the essential characteristics of Berber military resistance.”26 These 
not only include the reoccurring theme of resistance to colonial occupation and the imposition of 
foreign rule, but selective implementation of outside influences, specifically, the blending of 
                                               
24 Decret, Early Christianity, 1. 
 
25 Abun-Nasr, History, 30. 
 
26 Brett and Fentress, The Berbers, 41. 
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military strategies.  In addition to the Numidians fighting Rome, there were also internal conflicts. 
When Jugurtha’s army was weakened, he fled to his father-in-law, Bochus, to gain more forces, 
yet Bochus double-crossed him by delivering him to the Romans. 
By 33 CE, Rome controlled most of North Africa. In 25 CE, Augustus of Rome gave 
Mauretania to Numidian King Juba II, who was raised in Rome after Juba I was defeated in 46 
BCE by Julius Caesar. Juba II knew both the Amazigh language and Latin. He was married to 
Cleopatra Selene, the daughter of the famed Mark Anthony and Cleopatra of Egypt. Like her 
husband, Cleopatra Selene was relocated to Rome after her husband’s father’s defeat by Caesar.  
Augustus’ re-establishment of the Numidian Kingdom, “is one of the most noteworthy 
examples of the complete co-option of an African aristocrat into the Roman structure…[and] 
hardly the last.”27  Juba II and Cleopatra Selene had a son named Ptolemy who assumed the throne 
after his father’s death in 23 CE. Yet, Ptolemy’s reign was short-lived, as a unified rebellion 
emerged “as if all of Gaul had risen at once against the Romans.”28 It was during this uprising that 
emperor Caligula killed Ptolemy, “eliminating the last Berber kingdom in Africa,” since he had no 
heirs.29  
 
Roman Christianization 
 
Rome’s occupation of North Africa witnessed the gradual spread of Christianity to Imazighen 
during the third and fourth centuries CE. It is important to note that, “long before the arrival of 
Christianity, the Africans were already deeply religious,” and yet, “the past and present were able  
                                               
27 Ibid., 46. 
 
28 Ibid., 47. 
 
29 Ibid., 47. 
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to co-exist despite different dates of arrival in Africa and juxtaposition in belief and practice.”30 
Not only did the Imazighen  practice polytheism, but there was a significant Jewish population in 
Tamazgha as well, as already noted. The seemingly utopian, religiously tolerant way of living of 
the Imazighen began to decline near the end of the third century with the appointment of Diocletian 
as Emperor of Rome in 284.   
In 293 CE, Diocletian, his co-emperor Maximian, Galerius (lieutenant under Diocletian in 
the East), and Constantius (lieutenant under Maximian in the West) formed a “tetrarchy” seeking 
to solidify their divine right to rule. From 303-304 CE, they issued four edicts aimed at persecuting 
Christians. Several believers succumbed to martyrdom, including Roman Catholic Saint Crispina. 
                                               
30 Decret, Early Christianity, 7. 
 
Map 2  The spread of Christianity from 300 to 800 CE  
(Digital image. Weebly. Accessed March 11, 2019. 
http://chapt10rome.weebly.com/christianity.html) 
 
14 
 
Saint Crispina was beheaded in Theveste, Numidia, present-day Tebessa in Algeria near Tunisia 
boarder and the Aures Mountains. This is a significant historical detail, since this situates Christian 
activity close to where al-Kâhina’s clan lived.  
Amazigh Christian bishop, Donatus, began in Carthage leading the resistance movement 
in opposition of the Roman Catholic Church. Emerging as a reaction to the Diocletian edicts, this 
movement developed into Donaticism, a sect of Christianity. Due to the Catholic church being 
outnumbered by Donatist churches, a counter movement arose led by Augustine of Hippo, also 
known as St. Augustine whose, “mother  had been Christian for several generations, but his father 
was still pagan.”31 Further complicating Christian dynamics during this time, was the rise of a 
Donatist faction, the Circumcellion, between 340 and 345 CE. The Circumcellion were initially at 
odds with the “traditional” Donatists, but eventually both sects became allies against the Catholic 
Church. In 401 CE, Catholic missionaries were sent out to convert any non-Catholics and 
recommended to, “Catholic landowners to convert their Donatist peasantry by force.”32 The Edict 
of Unity enacted in 405 CE declared Catholics owners of all Donatist property, including that of 
Imazighen. By the end of  411 CE, Catholics controlled the cities of Mauretania and Numidia, but, 
“Donatism remained strong in the countryside…[and] mountain tribes of the interior and other 
tribes in the south were now a constant source of anxiety.”33 The Aures Mountains are located 
within present-day Algeria on the boarder of present-day Tunisia, where the Atlas and Saharan 
Mountain ranges meet. Because al-Kâhina’s clan lived in the Aures Mountains, it is possible that 
her clan were Donatists. If the Imazighen in the Aures, or more specifically al-Kâhina’s clan, were 
                                               
31 Susan Raven, Rome in Africa (New York, NY: Longman, 1984), 166. 
 
32 Ibid., 201. 
 
33 Ibid., 205. 
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not Donatists while under Roman control, they may have adopted the beliefs during the next wave 
of colonial invasions. 
Vandals/Byzantine Control 
 
In 430 CE Rome ceded control of Numidia to the Vandals. By the end of the decade, Vandals 
controlled  Carthage, bringing an end to the Roman Empire in North Africa for one-hundred years. 
Towards the end of his reign, Vandal King Huneric (d. 484) issued edicts persecuting Catholics, 
emulating edicts of the Romans, resulting in, “500 clergy from Carthage [being] denounced and 
sent into exile…the African Catholic leadership suffered much brutality: 334 pastors were exiled 
or dispersed; others were sent to Corsica to cut wood for royal fleets, while another 90 leaders 
died.”34 In 534 CE, the Eastern Roman Empire known as the Byzantine Empire under the rule of 
Justinian reclaimed North Africa. “Despite its victory, the Byzantines still faced a small but ever-
present  movement of “re-Berberization”.”35 The organized Imazighen resistance, including a re-
emergence of Donatism in Numidia, threatened the Empire’s control. To prevent the Byzantine’s 
access to the Aures Mountains, Imazighen partially destroyed Timgad. Previously, in 100 CE, 
Rome established Timgad in 100 CE as a military defense position against the mountain clans. 
The destruction of Timgad encapsulates Imazighen implementing the same tactics used by Rome  
in the destruction of Carthage , both attempting to thwart future conflicts. The Byzantine Empire 
held North Africa until the Arab invasion in the seventh century. 
 
 
                                               
34 Decret, Early Christianity, 194. 
 
35 Ibid., 195. 
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Arab Invasion & Islamization 
   
By 641, less than a decade after the passing of Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, Arabs had control 
of Egypt. It would still take over five decades for Arabs to conquer Numidia. Though this marked 
the beginnings of the religion of Islam in northern Africa, the spread of Islam and Arabization did 
not occur simultaneously. The Arabs faced organized Imazighen resistance, including under al-
Kâhina’s leadership. General Hassân lost his first battle in Carthage and retreated to Cyrenaica 
where he waited for military reinforcements. In circa 705, Hassân was victorious against al- Kâhina 
beheading her in battle. By 709, North Africa was firmly under Arab control and they, “adopted a 
language policy that enabled them to spread Arabic and Islamic values. The remarkable relation 
between Arabic and Islam, as mentioned in the Qur’an itself, made this spread and dominance of 
Arabic unavoidable.”36 Eventually the Arabic language became the dominant language in the 
region.  
Over 100 years after al-Kâhina’s death is when the first account available to us emerges.37 
With the introduction of her legend into Arabic literature, narratives appeared to enhance her 
depiction as resistance leader against the Muslim invasion. The promotion of Islamic literature to 
erase the Imazighen collective memory, “left most Berbers with no awareness of their actual 
past.”38  This was the case until the introduction of mafâkhir al-Barbar (“Boasts of the Berbers”39) 
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in the thirteenth century. The mafâkhir literary genre was a form of resistance with the goal of 
reconstructing Imazighen history. However, some scholars argue mafâkhir was actually a form of 
Islamization and the Imazighen, “were left with tribal genealogies, which increasingly included 
fabricated sharifian [Muslim] lineages.”40 Unifying origins would be a method used by the French 
colonial government, making Imazighen struggles for autonomy and inclusion even more 
complex.  
Ottoman Conquest 
 
Like the Arab invasion, the Ottoman Empire began by conquering Cairo, Egypt in 1517  and 
expanding westward.  The Ottomans controlled North Africa until 1800s  during which, “Berber 
populations were increasingly consigned to the periphery of society, and the Berbers as a named 
group gradually faded.”41 Unfortunately, the Ottoman Era in North Africa is underrepresented in 
scholarship, with less written in or translated to English,  and deserves further exploration.  
 
French Colonial Rule 
 
As the Ottoman Empire began to collapse in the early nineteenth century, France preyed on their 
weakness by taking control of Algeria and beginning their rule in Tamazgha. Algeria was deemed 
a French colony and became its longest held territory in Africa, with France occupying it from 
1830 until 1962.42 Initially, Kabylia (located in the Tell Atlas mountains within Algeria) was 
avoided, not only due to its, “harshness of temperatures, rocky terrain, dense forests, and poor soil  
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42 Tunisia from 1881 until 1956 and from 1912 until 1956 Morocco, were both French protectorates. Since Algeria 
was a colony, under French colonial rule, Algeria was an extension of the metropole, yet not all inhabitants had 
equal rights or were accorded to French citizens, resulting in a large settler community. 
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Figure 2  Photograph most atributed to Fatma n’Soumer 
  
(From: Digital Image. Algeria. Accessed March 10, 2019. 
https://www.algeria.com/forums/forum/culture-culture/history-histoire/29401-is-
lalla-fatma-n-soumer-s-photo-real-or-fake ) 
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quality,”43 but also due to the anti-French resistance initially led by Emir ‘Abd al-Qadâr from 1832 
until 1847. From 1854 to 1857, the final rebellion took place:  
Imazighen prophetess, Fatma n[‘]Soumer or Lalla Fatma (Lalla, “Lady”) took part 
in the resistance to the French in Kabylia in 1854, a woman leading the North 
African peoples to war once more, this time against the invading French. It took an 
army of 30,000 to finally defeat the prophetess.44  
 
The uprising led by Fatma n’Soumer shares strong parallels to al-Kâhina’s resistance to the Arab 
invasion over one-thousand years prior. Aside from the obvious similarity of a powerful woman 
leading an Amazigh military uprising, both women lived in a mountainous region near the present-
day Algeria/Tunisia boarder. These two female leaders are credited with the final resistance to 
outside invaders and often classified as prophetesses. There is, at least within Western scholarship, 
little written on the undisputed historical figure Fatma n’Soumer as compared to the volume of 
writings mentioning al-Kâhina. Although al-Kâhina’s beliefs are indeterminant,  Fatma n’Soumer 
is known to have been a devout Muslim. It is probable that her image is not used in current 
Imazighen social movements due to her Islamic identity, which is not inclusive of all Amazigh 
peoples.   
Ten years after defeating Fatima n’Soumer, the French established, “the strategic garrison 
town of Fort National…as a “throne of Kabylie,” and formal resistance ceased for a time.”45 In an 
attempt to maintain colonial control of the region, the French sought to gain knowledge of the 
inhabitants. Some information was gained from the poems and songs collected by Colonel 
Adolphe Hanoteau (d.1897 CE), and it was, “believed [they] would reveal the essence of the 
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Kabyle personality and level of intellectual and moral development,”46 creating what is known as 
the Kabyle Myth. French writers learned of, “the story of [al-]Kâhina’s resistance to Muslim 
invaders [which] captured [their] imagination.”47 The Kabyle Myth shifted the commonality of 
Eastern origins between Imazighen and Muslims set forth by  the mafâkhir literature and asserted 
indigenous Imazighen population as descendants of Rome and superior to Muslims.  
This new ideology influenced policy making, including the integration of French language 
into institutions. The alienation of Muslims, “drove [Arab-Islamic] nationalists to oppose the 
disintegrative influence of particularly French culture.”48  There was a push by Arab Islamic 
nationalists to resist French assimilation. Despite this, the colonial “policy of educating and 
training an elite who would become culturally and linguistically alien to their own people, that is, 
who would be "pseudo-Europeans",”49 was largely successful.  
 Algerian resistance movements prevailed throughout the colonial period, leading to the war  
for Algerian liberation from 1954  until independence in 1962, led by the Front de Liberation 
Nationale (FLN). The participation of Algerian woman the struggle for independence is well 
documented. As depicted by political philosopher Frantz Fanon, even under colonial control, 
Algerian women were able to use their social status uniquely, to benefit political resistance 
movements.50 Fanon describes how women voluntarily unveiled so they could seamlessly 
transport information for the independence movement, subverting the French colonial regime. The 
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French view of the veil being repressive, or associated with an antiquated practice, is a view that 
continues to be re-inscribed onto Western views of modernity. Resisting the imposition of Western 
ideologies is a key objective of current social movements in Tamazgha.    
 
Independence 
 
After independence, countries in North Africa adopted Arabization policies declaring Arabic the 
national language and Islam the official religion. However, French, “as the language of 
modernization,” continues to dominate the educational and political systems, “because it can bring 
about an individual’s social promotion and a valorized social well-being.”51 This policy 
contributed to the marginalization of Amazigh languages and demonstrates how colonial legacies 
has resulted in the belief that  development is tied to the Western beliefs . This view gets projected 
onto resistance movements of Imazighen, characterizing them as static and resisting modernity. 
When in fact, through waves of colonial occupation, “Berbers were neither merely passive victims 
of imperial conquest by the ancient world’s bearers of “modernity” and “globalization” nor stanch 
resisters of it.”52 Discrimination against Imazighen  gave rise to the 1980s political movement 
known as the “Berber Spring”, marking the beginning of current Imazighen nationalist and cultural 
movements, including feminist movements, in the region.  
Feminism in the Tamazgha region, as in other Muslim majority societies, can be loosely 
classified into two categories, secular and Islamic. Though there is often polarized interpretations 
of these terms, there seems to be some fluidity. Looking at Morocco, for example, secular 
feminism is not a “modern” movement or one that rejects Islam, whereas, “Islamic feminism is a 
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relatively new reality that has emerged in the heat of the 1990s’ ideological crisis over the woman 
issues.”53 Within these two classifications, there is a spectrum of views ranging between 
conservative, moderate, and liberal. Discussions surrounding Moroccan feminisms, reveal that 
both secular and Islamic ideologies are grappling with the Western idea of “universal feminism” 
and advocate for a new, uniquely Moroccan, definition of feminism that would meet their needs.  
According to linguist and gender studies professor Fatima Sadiqi, “[Al-]Kâhina’s female 
leadership did not rely on institutionalized authority,”54 and that is one of  the reasons she has 
become a symbol for feminist movements. The current generation of feminists emulate al-Kâhina, 
“to defend personal liberties and self-determination, carve out a space to act in spite of patriarchal 
constraints, or to become free and in control of one’s destiny.”55 By occupying an array of public 
spaces and not limiting themselves to institutional organizations, North African women are 
rebranding what feminism means locally. 
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Discussion of the Literature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Norman Roth 
 
The writings of the famed fourteenth-century scholar Ibn Khaldûn are the earliest source linking 
al-Kâhina to a Jewish identity. Norman Roth, a specialist in Jewish history and literature, analyzes 
the epithet Kâhina and elements of her story to ascertain whether she was a Jewish historical figure. 
Like me, Roth did not have access to Arabic texts so relied on other scholars’ works and 
translations of key texts about al-Kâhina.  
Arguments given for or against al-Kâhina as Jewish, concerns the epithet Kâhina. Support 
for her Jewishness claims Kâhina as a feminized title derived from the Hebrew of Kohen (priest).  
Roth supports Nahum Slouchz’s argument that al-Kâhina has Jewish origins but disagrees with 
her classification of al-Kâhina as a prophetess. Accounts by Abraham Ibn Daud, a twelfth-century 
Jewish historian from Spain, lead Roth to assert that a more precise Jewish title for al-Kâhina is 
Mu‘allima (Arabic for teacher). Roth postulates that Kâhina does not translate to ‘priestess,’ 
“rather a sort of divineress, which function was often performed among the Berbers as we know 
from Ibn Khaldûn and from the contemporary testimony of Procopius of Caesaria, a sixth-century 
Byzantine historian.”56 He further suggests that Dihya is to be read Dahiya which means crafty or 
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cunning in Arabic, citing Ibn Idhari al-Nuwari accounts on al-Kâhina’s divination powers. Roth 
concludes that not only is Kâhina a title but so is Dihya. 
For Roth, the confusion surrounding al-Kâhina’s name stems from H. Z. Hirschberg’s 1957 
article written in Hebrew. According to Roth, “Hirshberg concluded that Kâhina is a corruption of 
Kahiya (or Kahya),” rejecting both the name Dihya provided by Ibn Khaldûn and the title Kâhina. 
Roth asserts, Hirschberg’s translation of, “[t]he modern eulogy (so called qasida) of the Jews of 
Constantine,” were the basis of his findings.57  He provides the following poem (the bracketed 
insertions are Roth’s): 
Sons of Yeshurun [Israel], do not forget your persecutors, 
The Chaldeans, Caesar, Hadrian and Kahiya [or Kahya]. 
Cursed is that one, more cruel was she than all these together. 
She gave our virgins to her warriors 
And in the blood of our children she washed her feet. 
The Lord created her in order to atone for our sins. 
The Lord hates those who oppress His people. 
Return to me my children, so they may mourn me— 
I have left them in the hands of Kahiya [Kahya].58 
 
In this depiction of al-Kâhina, followers of Judaism are presented as victims of her violent polices.  
In Roth’s footnote citation, he clarifies the above translation is from Chouraqui’s English 
translation of Hirshberg, in which Hirshberg cites Moroccan Jewish historian, David Cazes. The 
translation provided in the article, according to Roth, “differs only slightly,” from Chouraqui’s. 
Ultimately, Hirshberg asserts even though the Jewish poem is referencing al-Kâhina, her actions 
are evidence against the claim of her being Jewish. Citing insufficient linguistic parallels between 
the Kâhina and Kahiya, Roth refutes Hirshberg’s analysis that al-Kâhina and the poem’s Kahiya 
are the same figure.  
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In his article, Roth also discusses two key background characters in al-Kâhina’s story, 
Kusayla and Khâlid.  Kusayla was a Christian Amazigh chief who converted to Islam, but 
eventually turned against the Arab leaders. Citing Wâqidî (d.822), via Ibn al-Athîr (d.1233), who 
depicts Kâhina seeking revenge for Kusayla’s death as her reason for an uprising against the 
Muslim invasion, Roth wonders if Kusayla and Kâhina were the beginning of Imazighen clans’ 
unification against outside occupation. It could be the beginning of unification against the Arabs, 
however, as evident with the Kings of Numidia, this would not have been the first joint effort 
against invaders.  Roth attributes the introduction of Khâlid to Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam (d.871), whom 
he believes is the earliest account, and credits Ibn ‘Idhâri for the notion that al-Kâhina had two 
other sons; one Imazighen and one Christian. Ibn Khaldûn draws the same conclusion stating she 
adopted her third son, the prisoner Khâlid. Roth points out that Khâlid shares the exact name of 
the grandson of the Caliph and argues the addition of Khâlid to the narrative is to encourage a 
reconciliation and unity between the Muslim and Imazighen populations.  
In Roth’s opinion, there is a mythical component to al-Kâhina’s story due to Ibn Khaldûn’s 
account that Kâhina ruled sixty-five years and died at the age of 120, the same as Moses. Al-Bakari 
(d. 1094 CE), according to Roth, wrote that she “was besieged in the fortress (Lajam),”59 but it 
was Ibn Khaldûn who declared the location of her death being at The Well of  al-Kâhina (Bir al-
Kâhina).   Attaching her legend to a geographical location adds validity to her existence. Roth 
notes that, “Hirschberg’s translation in Tarbiz is either incorrect or based on a different text. The 
site referred to [The Well of al-Kâhina] is near Gabes according to Jamil Abun-Nasr.”60 Historian, 
Abun-Nasr’s description is as follows: “Her second encounter with [Hassân] Ibn al-Nu’mân took 
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place near Gabis. She was defeated, pursued by Arab warriors, and eventually killed at a place in 
the Auras which came to be called Bir al-Khaina (al-Kâhina’s well).”61 Roth imprecisely depicts 
Abun-Nasr’s statement, as it says the battle with Hassân was near Gabis and then she fled before 
being killed. Abun-Nasr does not say how far away from the battle she was killed. Therefore, it is 
possible both translations are accurate.   
As far as al-Kâhina’s scorched earth policy before her death, Roth surmises it is likely later 
that historians found it necessary to assign blame for the agricultural decline of the early medieval 
period. Conclusively, Roth believes that al-Kâhina was a historical figure, although her story has 
been elaborated, and he argues that Ibn Khaldûn’s assertion that she was Jewish must be taken 
seriously. 
 
H.T. Norris 
 
Published in the same year as Roth’s article, The Berbers in Arabic Literature, is written by H.T. 
Norris, a Professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies. Like the title implies, Norris uses Arabic 
literature, both written and oral, to present his findings. In the preface, he perhaps echoes the 
mindset of scholars during the 1980s with the clarification of the term Berbers, “by Berbers I mean 
the family of North African people who share a common language of clearly distinguished and 
mutually unintelligible dialects.”62 He later asserts that “Berber has a linguistic but not an ethnic 
reality.”63 Norris’ goal in the book is to increase accessible material for future scholars by 
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prioritizing works written by Imazighen, yet, “[t]his book is not intended to be an historical survey, 
nor is it an anthropological study supported by documentary evidence.”64  
Norris compiles the writings about al-Kâhina from Ibn al-Athîr, Ibn ‘Idhâri, ‘Ubayd Allâh 
Ibn Sâlih, and Ibn Khaldûn to adequately, “assess how she was portrayed and imagined.”65 He 
asserts that al-Kâhina was a member of the Jarawa, who were a part of the Zenata group, residing 
in the Eastern Algeria Aures mountains, stating, “[t]hese mountains became a major rallying point 
for the Berbers, for the Banu Ifren and for the Botr in particular.”66 Norris claims her death at the 
age of 127 was at the hands of Hassân and two battles took place. Hassân was forced to retreat in 
the first battle, that is when al-Kâhina took Khâlid captive, eventually adopting him. The names 
of her two other sons, according to Norris, are Ifren and Yazdiyan. Before the second battle in 
c.705 CE (four-years after their first encounter), al-Kâhina sent her all her sons to Hassân to 
convert, shortly after he cut off her head during combat.  
Using the same Arabic sources as Roth, Norris intertwines accounts to create a 
sensationalized narrative. Using analogies, Norris portrays al-Kâhina as a Maghribian Boudica,67 
with loose, wild like the hair in the manner of Queen Asbyte of the Garamantes. Norris regards 
most of the story as a legend that incorporates embedded features of Arab storytellers with some 
historical reality, arguing Arabs are responsible for her creation, depiction, and reputation. He 
concludes the section on al-Kâhina with a quote by the French colonial scholar E.-F. Gautier that 
he believes, “perfectly summed up the significance of the story.”68 It reads: 
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The act of the Kâhina is something essentially Berber. It is particularly Botr. The 
Kâhina adopted an Arab son who was to play a predominant role in the last act of 
the drama. He it is who guides the true offspring of the old queen to the Arab Amir. 
Throughout the whole history of the Maghrib we shall come across the attraction 
which brings the nomads, both Arab and Berber closer together…. In the Maghrib, 
sedentaries and nomads have never tried to live together without the one disgorging 
the other. There lies the triumph of the Arab invasion. It was the turning point, and 
it was Hassân who passed beyond it. Musa Ibn Nusayr may come, but he will not 
meet more than a scattering of disorganized tribes, with real submission nowhere 
to be found, that is indeed true, but of serious resistance nothing more. And he will 
be able to launch Islam into a new adventure, much further onwards, across the 
water into Spain.69 
 
This quote illustrates the social complexity of the region, and how the legend of al-Kâhina was 
manipulated by Arabs to assimilate Imazighen and unify the region under Islam.  
 
 
Michael Brett and Elizabeth Fentress 
 
In The Berbers, Africanist Michael Brett and archeologist Elizabeth Fentress’ rely exclusively on 
written secondary sources and archeological evidence. As the editor highlights, they combine 
“perspectives of archaeology, anthropology, and history.”70 Brett and Fentress emphasize the role 
of Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam account as the “earliest substantial source” on al-Kâhina story and, “her 
prophecy of Hassân’s eventual victory is the whole purpose of her existence.”71 The introduction 
of The Well of al-Kâhina  as site of her death they credit to the Ibn ‘Idhâri during the fourteenth 
century, and give the location of The Well of al-Kâhina, “to the west of the Aures mountains.”72 
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They echo Roth’s opinion about  The Well of al-Kâhina being a geographical insertion to 
strengthen the myth. 
Ultimately, Brett and Fentress opine al-Kâhina’s story is a legend of the destiny of a 
Imazighen Prince (Khalid), due to her “prophesying her own death at the hands of the Arabs and 
the future of her sons in their service, is a celebration of the alliance of the two nations.”73 They 
assert that Imazighen embraced their new Arab identity as al-Kâhina prophesized, eventually 
leading to the creation of Islamic-Amazigh nation. This is a shift from an image of hostility to one 
of friendship between Imazighen and Arabs. Roth highlights this shift and sees Kusayla’s death as 
the catalyst for al-Kâhina’s resistance to the Arab invasion. Brett and Fentress emphasize the 
impact of Arabization on Imazighen and the need for adding not only Amazigh to the historical 
narrative, but also reimagining the region to include the society where women have more freedom 
than their Arab counterparts.    
 
Abdelmajid Hannoum 
 
Colonial Histories, Post-Colonial Memories: The Legend of the Kâhina, A North African Heroine, 
is the only book written in English exclusively on al-Kâhina, and possibly the most exhaustive 
literary study written on her. Abdelmajid Hannoum, anthropologist and author, uses a myriad of 
primary and secondary sources, mainly written in Arabic or French, attempting, “to show that the 
account of the Kâhina was first transmitted orally, and even when it was put into writing it 
continued to be part of folklore.”74 The only available texts about al-Kâhina were written after the 
                                               
73 Ibid.,87. 
 
74 Hannoum, Colonial Histories, 1. 
 
30 
 
Arab invasion and according to Hannoum commonality exists between Muslim and Imazighen 
folklore features.  
In Chapter One, Hannoum examines available Arabic sources, including those used by 
Roth, Norris, Brett, and Fentress, but Hannoum’s work is more expansive with his inclusion of 
key translations and authors names. Like Roth, he believes the earliest account is by Wâqidî (d. 
822) reported by Ibn al-Athir (d.1233). Hannoum presents two more authors Khalîfa Ibn Khayyât 
al-‘Usfûri (d. 854) and Balâdhurî (d. 892), whose accounts of al-Kâhina are brief. Hannoum 
argues:  
[f]or Wâqidî it is explicit, and there is a a description in his account of the misdeeds 
of the Kâhina—ill-treating Muslims, brutalizing the population of Ifriqiya. In 
Baladhuri it is expressed by the death of a Muslim general and by the takeover of a 
non-Muslim female ruler. In Ibn Khayyat, the appointment of Hassân as a general 
presupposes what the semioticians call a “situation of lack”, which makes the 
Caliph send a hero to “fulfill the lack”.75 
  
Hannoum argues that Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam’s (d. 871) account, “undertook a local history, that is, of 
Egypt and the Maghrib,”76by utilizing local memory.  
Roth and Hannoum agree that the inclusion of Khâlid by Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam was a 
significant shift in the narrative. For Hannoum, the addition of sorcery along with al-Kâhina’s 
voice into the narrative, “not only tells the story of the heroism of the Arabs, it tells that of the 
Berbers as well.” The ideology imposed onto the narrative by this point “contains the myth of the 
civilizing mission of Islam… Hassân is the symbol of Islam and the Kâhina is the symbol of the 
Jahiliya,” meaning pre-Islamic ignorance.”77  
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During the eleventh century, significant elements are introduced to the narrative by 
geographer al-Bakrî (d.1094) and biographer al-Mâlikî (d. 1058). Al-Bakri’s account in the 
eleventh century, states al-Kâhina and Hassân’s first battle was in Gabes against “an old general 
of Kusayla,”78 changing al-Kâhina’s gender from female to male. This appears to be the only 
account that asserts al-Kâhina as anything but female. Hannoum argues that the insertion of a male 
anti-hero allowed Hassân to be defeated and the loss classified as a test of faith. Al- Bakri includes 
the location of al-Kâhina dwelling to be the fortress of Lajm,79 and that she was killed at Tabarqa.80 
This provide a different, or perhaps more precise, geographical location for her death than previous 
scholars.  
In the text by Maliki, also written in the eleventh century, Hannoum analyzes the spatial 
divisions within in the narrative:  
…the space the battle took place is divided along with the actors’ in 
the following manner: 
Upstream   v.  Downstream 
Dar al-Islam  v.  Dar al-Harb 
Hassân and his army  v.  The Kâhina and her army81 
 
These divisions validate Muslims’ superiority over Imazighen and the details provided by  the 
account further contribute to the story’s authenticity or believability.  
Hannoum asserts the following elements are incorporated into al-Kâhina’s legend by the 
end of the twelfth century: two battles with Hassân, the introduction of Khâlid as her adopted son, 
and the location of her death. Hannoum moves forward into the Medieval Historiography, “that is 
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from the thirteenth to the fourteenth centuries, by historians mainly, but not exclusively, 
Maghribi.”82 However, he begins with a ninth century account from Ibn al-Raqiq (d.1028): 
This account was presumably written at the beginning of the eleventh century, and 
my analysis of it leads me to rethink my hypothesis regarding the construction of 
the legend. The account is a part of a book entitled Tarikh Ifraquiya wa al-Maghrib, 
attributed to the Maghribi historian Ibn al-Raqiq (d. 1027-28), but most probably 
he didn’t write it. I argue, however, that the book was written in the thirteenth 
century because it is only after the account of Ibn al-Athir that the story of the 
Kâhina integrated the themes that one finds in the book attributed to Ibn al-Raqiq. 
The reverse hypothesis would be that the story already acquired most of its themes 
in the eleventh century. This hypothesis does not stand, however, because neither 
Maliki nor Bakri mentions the very important theme of the destruction, a theme that 
has been systematically reported since Ibn al-Athir.83 
   
Hannoum sees the ninth-century Waqidi’s account, referred to by Ibn al-Athir in the thirteenth-
century, as the starting point of his hypothesis. He attributes Ibn al- Athir’s introduction of the 
scorched earth policy tactics ascribed to al-Kâhina.84 But Hannoum suspects that the account by 
Ibn al-Raqiq could not have been written in the eleventh century.   
 Hannoum expands on Hirshberg’s arguments and provides a more complete translation of 
David Cazes’ French-colonial era poem, than provided by Roth: 
 O Children of Yeschouroun, 
 Do not forget your persecutors: 
 The Chaldas, Caesar, Hadrian and the Kahiya, 
 That damned woman, more cruel than the others combined, 
 She gave virgins to her warriors; 
 God has created her to make us expiate our sins 
 But God hates those who make his people suffer. 
 
 The refrain is: 
  
 Give me back my children 
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 To mourn me (after my death); 
 I have left them  
 In the hands of the Kahiya.85 
 
Hannoum gives more context to its transmission and translation and describes it as, “[a] poem in 
Hebrew with Arabic characters communicated to Cazes by an erudite Jew of Constantine.”86 
Despite the chain of events, Hannoum insists that the interpretation should be attributed to Cazes’ 
and his “cognitive agenda…to persuade readers of the cruelty of the [al-]Kâhina toward Jews.”87  
Without addressing Ibn Khaldûn’s possible agenda, Hannoum posits that his account of al-
Kâhina is the final narrative by a historian, “a complete synthesis, integrating all the themes we 
have discussed, and adding two more details about the Kâhina.”88 Ibn Khaldûn reported she, “ruled 
the Berbers for thirty-five years, and lived one hundred and twenty seven years.”89 As Roth pointed 
out in his analysis, this would make her the same age as Moses.   
During French colonial period in North Africa, the narrative of al-Kâhina, now acquired 
by colonial scholars, shifted from anti-heroine to heroine. Hannoum attributes the change to French 
writers, including Dennis Dominique Cardone (d.1783) Ernest Mercier (d.1955), and Emile-Felix 
Gautier (d.1940). Since Rome inhabited the region prior to the Arab invasion and France 
succeeded Rome, the French believed they,“ had the right, if not the duty, to colonize.”90 In their 
minds Imazighen were not Arabs, and therefore more likely to convert to Christianity.  Hannoum, 
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86 Ibid., 53. 
 
87 Ibid., 53. 
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89 Ibid., 19. 
 
90 Ibid, 37. 
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based on his analysis of literature on al-Kâhina, believes that only her gender as a female is 
consistent throughout the centuries.  
Hannoum asserts, “[t]he oral tradition about the [al-]Kâhina contained many themes, 
integrated into the oral tradition with the consent of the community…thus a folklore theme is not 
the creation of an individual but of a group.”91 Relying exclusively on Arabic written sources from 
over 500 years after al-Kâhina’s death Hannoum does not effectively make his argument that oral 
traditions, not just writings, perpetuated her legend. He acknowledges that, “[o]ral tradition about 
the [al-]Kâhina existed in North Africa, mainly in Algeria and Tunisia, long before the arrival of 
the French.”92 However, he goes on to credit the French with the preservation of al-Kahina, noting 
that “it was thanks to the French that some of this was collected, translated, and published.”93 The 
book is a selection of Arabic works and predominantly French scholarship on al-Kâhina, resulting 
in an analysis without a clear framework. Despite that, it is a great resource for scholars. It is a 
survey of not only of writings about al-Kâhina, but of many non-English works, and is an example 
of how history becomes legend, manipulated for different political agendas across time.   
 
Bruce Maddy-Weitzman 
    
Middle Eastern and African historian Bruce Maddy-Weitzman’s points out the suspicious nature 
of the narrative of al-Kâhina, due to the delay the narrative’s written transmision and that it is 
written from an Arab perspective. Though he reiterates Ibn Khaldûn’s depictions, Maddy-
Weitzman argues:   
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The absence of any verifiable knowledge of her personal life, and even her real 
name (Dihya?), increased her mythological status, so much so that she is sometimes 
presented as the mother of another semimythological figure from this period, Tariq 
Ibn Ziyad,  the commander of the mostly Berber Muslim forces who led the 
crossing of the Straits of Gibraltar and then disappeared from history, leaving only 
the rock that bears his (corrupted) name, Jabel Tariq.94 
  
He believes al-Kâhina’s story is a myth but acknowledges her role in French Algeria colonial 
project.  Evoking parallels to Joan of Arc, several French writers appropriated and manipulated 
the legend of al -Kâhina, “in ways that suited their colonial agenda.”95   
 
Benjamin Hendrickx 
 
In 2013, professor of Greek and Latin Studies, Benjamin Hendrickx argues that al-Kâhina was 
Christian and her story was manipulated. For him, “the role of the Roman Byzantines was confined 
to a ‘footnote-status’; so were the references to their policy, administration, victories and defeats 
and military institutions.”96 He attempts to defend his argument by analyzing secondary sources. 
Hendrickx believes that Hannoum omitted works that did not support his hypotheses, such as 
Christides and Charles Diehl. Hendrickx postulates the presence of Greek sources on al-Kâhina 
and the overlooking of Byzantine sources, “may reflect some indifference of the Byzantines in 
general and their leaders as well as their historians in particular toward the North African 
situation.”97   
 According to Hendrickx, in 697, after al-Kâhina’s successful battle against Hassân, 
Byzantines regained control of Carthage and neighboring areas. He goes on to argue, “[i]t is 
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possible, if not probable, that the Kâhina during this period destroyed fortresses, villages and the 
countryside near the Arab occupied territory in Cyrenaica in order to create a buffer zone against 
the enemy.”98  Unlike Roth’s speculation that the portrayal of Kusayla as a Christian and al-Kâhina 
Jewish was symbolic of early Imazighen unification, Hendrickx believes that both were Christians 
who commanded armies comprised of Imazighen and Roman-Byzantine troops. He argues that the 
elements of al-Kâhina’s story can be classified as the following: 
• Factual:  
o Imazighen queen (or ‘chief’)  
o Is considered a ‘prophetess.’ 
o She continued the policy of Kusayla  
o Her sons converted to Islam      
• Probable:  
o She had two sons 
o She carried a wooden image into war (possibly a cross) 
• False:  
o Her sons had different fathers (Imazighen and Greek) 
o Genealogies attributed to her  
 
Hendrickx never addresses the prominent character Khâlid or the origins of her name, which are 
two significant features in the Arabic narrative. He does present a good argument, but due to source 
limitations, his purpose seems as ideologically motivated as the other accounts.  
 
Alexander Beider  
 
By studying the history and origin of names, Alexander Beider addresses the theory of Judeo-
Berbers. As a specialist in Jewish studies, he asserts that before the twentieth century, no Jewish 
text indicates a “mass conversion of Berbers to Judaism.”99  He cites al-Idris and Ibn Abi Zar’ for 
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mentioning of Jewish peoples in the region. However, it was not until Ibn Khaldûn that mention 
is made of converts to the religion. Beider highlights Ibn Khaldûn’s narrative of al-Kâhina, but 
postulates that “[i]t is only after her death in a battle that Islam became really widespread among 
Berbers, while before the events in question various Berber tribes were Christian or pagan.”100 He 
goes on to accredit Ibn Khaldûn for the basis for what he calls Judeo-Berber theory and Nahum 
Slouschz 1908 writings for fortifying it with the elaboration of Khaldûn’s narrative. 
Beider, states that the notion of Kâhina deriving from a Phoenician feminized Cohen, that 
Slouschz suggests, is unfounded. Not only does the timeline not fit, but Slouschz fails to discuss 
the history of the Imazighen clans in any scientific manner. For Beider, Kâhina is entirely of Arabic 
origins, and, “the meaning [female soothsayer, fortuneteller] perfectly fits the information 
provided by Ibn Khaldûn.”101 After his lengthy analysis of scholars who support the Judeo-Berber 
theory based on Jewish surnames, Beider deduces that there is no, “genetic contribution of the 
Berber-speaking ancestors, proselytes or not, being significant for the Judeo-Arabic speaking Jews 
who live in Modern times in North Africa.”102  
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Present-Day Representation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2006, Northwestern Africa Imazighen Art specialist Cynthia Becker photographed a graffiti 
mural just outside of Tizi Ouzou in the Kabyle region of Algeria that depicts three figures, one 
female (al-Kâhina) and two males (King Massinissa and Jugurth). Becker points out that, the 
subjects are inspirational historical figures utilized by the current Imazighen movements.  
Figure 3 Graffiti Mural in Kabyle Region 
 
(Becker, Cynthia. “The Kahina: The Female Face of Berber History.” accessed February 18, 
2019, http://www.mizanproject.org/the-kahina-the-female-face-of-berber-history/.) 
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Figure 4 Lecomre-Vernet, Berber Woman, France, 1870   
 
(From: Becker, Cynthia. “The Kahina: The Female Face of Berber History.” accessed February 18, 
2019, http://www.mizanproject.org/the-kahina-the-female-face-of-berber-history/.) 
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Additionally, the use of Tifinagh in public spaces is also a form of resistance. Becker believes that 
the depictions of al-Kâhina, including this one, derive from the French orientalist Lecomre-
Vernet’s 1870 painting entitled Berber Woman. Becker describes the symbolism: 
Painted in the hyperrealist style typical of nineteenth-century orientalist art, 
Lecomte-Vernet painted the bare arm of this female figure to exude a sense of 
strength, while her sidelong glance suggests that she is assessing a threat—a glance 
also captured by the graffiti artist. Her red garment suggests courage and sacrifice, 
while she wears Berber-style jewelry, including a silver headpiece, broches 
(fibulae), and silver bracelets. The desert background suggests the geographic 
setting of northern Africa, yet it is removed enough from any particular historical 
or social context that Imazighen activists can use this painting to illustrate the story 
of this powerful female warrior, to whom activist commonly refer to as the “Berber 
Queen.”103 
 
Becker continues to highlight Imazighen activism in Algeria, with the 2003 erection of a statue of 
al-Kâhina by L’Association Aures El-Kahia. The statue is located in Baghaii, Algeria town center 
and granted permission by the national government. However, Becker incorrectly states that 
Baghaii “activists have encouraged the government to preserve the ruins of a fortress they attribute 
to the Kâhina, claiming that she erected it to oppose the advancing Muslim army.”104 Imazighen 
activists did play a role in  conservation of  her fortress, however, the fortress in located in the 
town of El Djem, Tunisia not Baghaii, Algeria. It is possible the belief that El Djem is al-Kahina’s 
last citadel, is due to early accounts stating her fatal battle was with Hassân at the fortress of Lajm. 
The fortress at El Djem was placed on the UNESCO List of World Heritage sites and in 2009 
action was taken to preserve it.105   
 Al-Kâhina’s persona is not merely used within the Aures Mountain Region or even North 
Africa for that matter. In the United States, there are several beauty product lines that use her name, 
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typically revolving around Moroccan Argan oil. This is fascinating since al-Kâhina is not directly 
linked to the regions in Morocco. The Imazighen feminist movements there still use her image, 
but I wonder if it is due to Imazighen solidarity, transmission of the legend, or if there is a missing 
link in the narrative. The U.S. companies, such as Kahina-Giving Beauty specializing in argan oil 
beauty products, use al-Kâhina to sell their products and are guilty of not only misappropriating 
her identity but a culture.106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
106 New York based company Kahina-Giving Beauty, is featured in popular magazines including Vouge, Allure, and 
People, specializes in argan oil-based beauty products. According to their website, the argan used is sourced from, 
“high in the Anti-Atlas Mountains of Morocco,” and their products are, “a truly effective and ethical line of luxury 
skin and body care products that bridges tradition and modernity by evoking the sultry spirit of Morocco through a 
modern gaze.” By sexualizing Morocco and tying modernity to the West, Kahina-Giving Beauty evokes 
“Orientalism” (as coined by Edward Said).  
The company boasts that one-percent of profits are given back to the community. The website also points out it can 
take up to eight hours for one woman to harvest enough nuts required for one liter of oil. Kahina-Giving Beauty sells 
100mL for $82 that translates to $820 for one-liter, meaning one-percent of sales equals $8.20 and profits less than 
that. It should also be noted that high quality argan oil sells in the region for roughly $30 a liter, not including the 
likely wholesale discount. The most the community is receiving $38.20 per liter. If money is going directly to the 
women harvesting, they are making about $4.75 an hour.  
The company only uses the pejorative term berber when discussing the Amazigh women on the website and there is 
no mention of al-Kahina’s story or how the company’s name was derived.  – www.kahina-givingbeauty.com/ 
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Figure 5 al-Kâhina Monument in Baghaii, Algeria 
 
(Digital image. Algeria360. Accessed March 11, 2019. 
https://www.algerie360.com/khenchela-la-statue-de-la-reine-amazigh-
dihya-incendiee-a-baghai/) 
Figure 6 Roman Colosseum in El Djem, Tunisia 
 
(Digital image. AncientOrigins. Accessed March 11, 2019. 
www.ancient-origins.net/ancient-places-africa/amphitheatre-el-djem-
gladiatorial-arena-tunisia-003321)    
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Conclusion  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The multifaceted elements of al-Kâhina’s story covered in the literature make discerning fact from 
fiction difficult. I deduce from these sources that she likely implemented a scorched earth policy, 
mimicking the Roman war tactics like her predecessors, and that she was killed in a resistance 
battle against the Arabs. It is possible that she had sons and even an adopted captive son. It is 
difficult to ascertain their names and to determine al-Kâhina’s own veritable name.  
As far as her religious beliefs, there is not enough evidence to conclude she was Jewish. 
All support for her Judeo-Berber identity primarily steams from interpretations of Ibn Khaldûn’s 
assertions. Based on the lengthy Roman occupation introducing Christianity to the region, along 
with the evidence placing Christians near the Aures Mountains, I surmise, if al-Kahina was 
anything other than polytheistic, she was Christian.  However, more historical and present-day 
research is needed into the variety beliefs and practices by non-Muslim Imazighen in the Aures 
Mountain region. Such research should entail in-depth collection and analysis of the Amazigh oral 
traditions. Moreover, an investigation into new written sources, outside of Arabic and French, is 
needed. Perhaps there are epigraphic graffiti in Tifinagh or writings in Hebrew that have yet to be 
discovered or translated. Although al-Kâhina was killed in battle she still could have been buried 
or memorialized near the illustrious Well of al-Kâhina just waiting to be discovered by 
archeologists.  
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The use of al-Kâhina as a symbol of Amazigh unity in contemporary politics reflects a 
longstanding history of resistance organizing by the Imazighen. Due to the ambiguity surrounding 
al-Kâhina’s beliefs and motives, she can represent a diversity of Amazigh people. This is one 
reason her legend has been appropriated and indeed why it has survived over fourteen centuries. 
Not only is her image depicted and her legend perpetuated, al-Kâhina’s name is used by a variety 
of organizations in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and perhaps even Libya. The symbolic uses of al-
Kâhina by Imazighen to combat political and social marginalization is new, but their desire for 
Imazighen for autonomy and equality is ever-present.    
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